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I use evidence from psychiatric disorders involving the experience of depersonal-
isation to decompose the causal and cognitive structure of experiences reported as
self-awareness.  I  combine insights  from predictive  coding theory and the ap-
praisal theory of emotion to explain the association between hypoactivity in the
Anterior Insular Cortex and depersonalization. This resolves a puzzle for some
theories raised by the fact that reduced affective response in depersonalization is
associated with normal interoception and activity in Posterior Insular Cortex. It
also elegantly accounts for the role of anxiety in depersonalisation via the role of
attention in predictive coding theories.
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“Who is the I that knows the bodily me,
who has an image of myself and a sense of
identity over time, who knows that I have
propriate  strivings?”  I  know  all  these
things, and what is more, I know that I
know them. But who is  it  who has this
perspectival  grasp?  It  is  much  easier  to
feel the self than to define the self (Allport
1961, p. 128)
1 Preliminary remarks
I think Allport has it the wrong way round. It is
easy to define the self, as he in fact does, as the
thing that thinks, feels, perceives and has a sense
of identity over time. It is hard, however, to a find
an entity that fits the definition. This is so even
though, according to Allport, experiencing being
a self is unproblematic (“it is easier to  feel the
self”). In fact, the experience of being someone is
actually  very  elusive,  phenomenologically  and
conceptually. On some accounts self-awareness is
actually the experience of  Being No-One1 (Met-
1 Strictly speaking, the experience is not of being no one, since there is no
one to be. Rather it is an experience we cannot help but take to be of
being someone, even though there is no entity causing the experience.
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zinger 2003). In this chapter I use disorders of
self-awareness to develop an account of the exper-
ience which gives rise to the feelings referred to by
Allport. In the final sections we shall see whether
our experience is  of  being someone,  no-one,  or
something other than a self. Perhaps a body. Or
the process of thinking.
The conclusion is that self-awareness is al-
most a necessary or inevitable illusion when the
mind is functioning smoothly. The experience of
being  a  self  is  produced  by  mechanisms  that
compute  the  relevance  of  sensory  (including,
and especially, bodily) information to a variety
of  organismic  goals  represented  at  different
levels  of  explicitness  in  a  cognitive  hierarchy.
The computations  relate  information  to  those
goals, not to selves. Those computations of goal
relevance  produce  consequent  bodily  feelings.
Those, and only those, feelings give us the phe-
nomenal information we need to plan, remem-
ber,  and  interact  with  other  people  and  the
world as though we are unified selves. Thomas
Metzinger  argues  that  integration  of  informa-
tion in experience amounts to the construction
of a phenomenal avatar, which the brain uses to
manoeuvre  the  organism  through  the  world
(Blanke &  Metzinger 2009;  Metzinger 2011). I
agree, and the rest of the chapter can be seen as
an attempt to anatomise that avatar. I use evid-
ence from psychiatric disorders involving the ex-
perience of depersonalisation to decompose the
causal and cognitive structure of experiences re-
ported as self-awareness.
2 Introduction
So many psychiatric disorders are explained in
terms of the way the patient experiences herself
that, even if intuitive or philosophical theories
which posit a self as the object of experience are
not correct, there is an interesting phenomenon
there to be explained. My idea is that the best
integrative explanation of those disorders is ipso
facto the best philosophical theory of self-aware-
ness  because  those  disorders  cannot  be  ex-
plained other than via a model of the way the
There is no substantial Cartesian, or bodily, or neural, entity that sus-
tains the properties ascribed by Allport. Thus part of Metzinger’s project
is to explain why we feel as though we are substantial entities.
experience is generated in normal and abnormal
situations.2 Once we have explained those dis-
orders we can determine the theoretical utility
of  overlapping  folk,  clinical  and  philosophical
conceptions  of  self-awareness.  Thus,  the  ap-
proach I take is consistent with that proposed
by Dominic Murphy in his plea for a (cognitive
neuro)  scientific  psychiatry:  “we  arrive  at  a
comprehensive set of positive facts about how
the  mind  works,  and  then  ask  which  of  its
products and breakdowns matter for our various
projects” (2006, p. 105). 
So until the concluding sections I use the
term self-awareness  to  refer  to  the experience
we report in terms of awareness of being a uni-
fied persisting entity: the same person at a time
and over time. It may turn out that such exper-
iences are illusions or misinterpretations of some
other  phenomenon,  perhaps  because  there are
no such entities as selves, but I delay that dis-
cussion until the evidence is assembled. To anti-
cipate, I think the intuitive folk concept of self-
awareness is very like the intuitive concept of
episodic memory, which is of “re-experiencing”
a previous episode. Cognitive neuroscience tells
us that in fact episodic memory experiences are
constructed  to  suit  current  cognitive  context
rather than retrieved intact. However it does no
harm  in  everyday  life  to  think  of  episodic
memory as content-preserving retrieval of past
experience. Similarly the intuitive conception of
self-awareness  tracks  processes  which,  when
they  function  harmoniously,  produce  experi-
ences  that  provide  a  plausible  basis  for  the
concept  of  a  unified and persisting self.  That
2 In other words I take the strong view advocated by Murphy. The on-
tology of the mind is the ontology of cognitive science. The reason is
that only with the correct theory of cognitive architecture in place
can we understand how neural  processes  implement  the cognitive
processes  whose  operations  we  experience  as  personal-level  phe-
nomenology.  That  personal-level  phenomenology  provides  the  raw
material for intuitive or folk explanations that abstract from cognit-
ive and neural realization. But that abstraction is precisely why, as
Halligan and Marshall once memorably said, in the absence of a suit-
ably constrained cognitive model, psychiatry will be  consumed by
“the expensive and extensive search for non existent entities” (Hal-
ligan & Marshall 1996, p. 6). I take the view that mechanistic (in the
sense of neuroscientific) and phenomenological (based on reflection
on the nature of experience) explanation are not independent pro-
jects. One could have a purely personal-level phenomenological onto-
logy of mind. But the fact that such ontologies mislead about the
sources of psychiatric disorder is a reason to search for an integrative
theory. But the only way neuroscience can explain experience is via a
detailed computational, cognitive theory. 
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concept, while not entirely accurate, provides a
useful ability to represent and communicate suf-
ficient unity and persistence. If I tell you I will
be happy to pick you up at the airport you need
to be able to rely on  me to be at the Arrivals
gate. The precise nature of my (dis)unification
as a single self is not relevant. If I told you I
would send my body but would not be present
myself  you  would  phone  a  psychiatrist.  (It
would  be  super  to  be  able  to  deputise  your
body  to  attend  departmental  meetings,  wed-
dings  etc.  on  your  behalf,  wouldn’t  it?)  Yet
something like  that  phenomenon of  alienation
occurs in depersonalisation, as a deeply felt and
distressing  phenomenon.  The difference  in  ex-
perience between people with depersonalisation
and those without it is  an essential  explanan-
dum both for  psychiatry and for  philosophers
interested in the (possibly illusory) phenomeno-
logy of selfhood.
The rest  of  the  chapter  proceeds  as  fol-
lows.  I  first  discuss  the  Cotard  delusion,  in
which  people  say that  they have  died,  disap-
peared or do not exist (délire de négation). The
Cotard delusion raises a set of questions about
the relationship between self-awareness, bodily
experience,  and  affective  processing.  I  outline
some suggestive intuitive answers to these ques-
tions based on the phenomenology of the dis-
order but argue that they are insufficient as ex-
planations. A deeper explanation is provided by
the cognitive neuroscience of depersonalisation.
That explanation relies on a theoretical frame-
work that draws on 
I. The appraisal theory of emotion
II. The  simulation  model  of  memory  and
prospection
III. The hierarchical predictive coding model
of cognitive processing
This framework allows us to explain how:
• affective  experiences  provide  the  basis  for
self-awareness  as  a  distinct  form of  bodily
awareness moment to moment
• those moment to moment experiences of self-
awareness can be annexed to cognitive pro-
cesses  whose temporal  reach is  longer  than
the present,  creating the experience/illusion
of a continuing self
• when affective processing is compromised the
resultant experience is reported as change, or
in extreme cases, loss, of self. Mere absence
of bodily or affective response per se does not
lead to depersonalisation. What leads to de-
personalisation is the absence of predicted af-
fective  responses  that  normally  constitute
self-awareness  that  leads  to  depersonalisa-
tion. This explanation also provides a full ex-
planation of an intriguing phenomenological
observation made by Cotard about the role
of anxiety in generating depersonalisation.
With this theoretical framework in place I dis-
cuss depersonalisation disorder and depersonal-
isation aspects of the Cotard delusion, resolving
some of the questions raised by the initial phe-
nomenological explanation.
Once those questions are answered we can
make some comments on the theoretical utility
of philosophical theories of self-awareness, which
for convenience I classify into four types: Illus-
ory Self, Fat Controller, Embodied Self, Narrat-
ive  Self.  The Illusory Self  is  a  version of  the
Humean idea that self-awareness is either illus-
ory or a theoretically loaded misdescription of
some  other  experiential  phenomenon  (percep-
tual,  interoceptive,  emotional,  somatic).  It  is
quite  consistent  with  the  Illusory  Self  theory
that the experience is a “necessary illusion” cre-
ated by architecture installed by evolution. The
Fat Controller  theory is  that self-awareness  is
the experience of  a genuine  substantial self,  a
locus of higher order cognitive integration and
top  down  control  (like  the  aptly-named  Will
Self’s Fat Controller in his  Quantity Theory of
Insanity). Embodied Self theories identify self-
awareness with forms of bodily awareness. Fi-
nally there are Narrative views of the self, thin
and thick. On the thin view the self is a “centre
of narrative gravity”, a fictive entity generated
by the Joycean machine to organize and com-
municate. On thicker views the self is not a fic-
tion  but  a  genuine cognitive  entity whose  es-
sence is to construct and communicate its own
autobiography as an essential aspect of higher
order  cognitive  control.  The  Thin  view  goes
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naturally with the Illusory Self view: it explains
the persistence of the Illusion, while the Thick
view (naturally enough) fits well with Fat Con-
troller views.
Cognitive neuroscience does not vindicate
any  of  these  theories.  However  this  does  not
mean that we should regard the phenomenon of
self-awareness  as  empirically  disconfirmed.  It
turns out that there are cognitive processes that
generate experiences with some of the proper-
ties ascribed by different theories under differ-
ent  conditions.  So,  as  with  episodic  memory,
rather than explaining self-awareness away, we
can describe and explain the nature of the ex-
periences reported as self-awareness in terms of
the structure of the processing which generates
it. Self-awareness is  a cognitive illusion, based
on the nature of affective processing. The relev-
ant  experience  plays  a  crucial  role  in  higher
levels  of  cognitive  control  that  organise  and
communicate experience in narrative form: frag-
ments, episodes, chronicles, histories and epics
(Currie & Jureidini 2004; Goldie 2011; Jureidini
2012). This conjunction of processes makes self-
awareness  an  irresistible  illusion.  The  nature
and necessity of  this  illusion is shown by the
nature of the disorders that arise when it fails. 
3 The phenomenology of the Cotard 
syndrome
In  their  study  of  uncommon  psychiatric  syn-
dromes  Enoch &  Trethowan (1991) provided a
haunting clinical vignette. They described a pa-
tient who said that her body was decomposing
and disappearing and that eventually she would
be “just a voice”. Another patient suffering from
the same condition described himself as a “dead
star” orbiting an inert galaxy. The Cotard delu-
sion, from which these patients suffer, was de-
scribed by Jules Cotard in 1882 as a “délire de
négation”,  a  delusion  of  inexistence  (Cotard
1880,  1882,  1884,  1891;  Debruyne et al. 2009).
It is also described as a paradoxical belief that
one  is  dead.  The  current  cultural  fascination
with zombies provides the metaphor of “walking
corpse”  syndrome  to  describe  the  condition.
However,  as  with  many  psychiatric  disorders,
perhaps  the  most  telling  descriptions  and ex-
planations of the phenomenon were provided in
the nineteenth century, in this case by Cotard
himself. He described his patient thus:
Miss  X  affirms  she  has  no  brain,  no
nerves, no chest, no stomach, no intestines;
there’s only skin and bones of a decompos-
ing body. . . . She has no soul, God does
not exist, neither the devil. She’s nothing
more than a decomposing body, and has
no need to eat for living, she cannot die a
natural death, she exists eternally if she’s
not burned, the fire will be the only solu-
tion  for  her.  (Translation  from  Cotard
1880)
Cotard explained this delusion as a consequence
of  a  particular  type  of  psychotic  depression
“characterized by anxious melancholia, ideas of
damnation or rejection, insensitivity to pain, de-
lusions  of  nonexistence  concerning  one’s  own
body, and delusions of immortality” (Debruyne
et al. 2009, p. 67).
More  recently  (Gerrans 2000,  2001;
Debruyne et al. 2009) the delusion of inexist-
ence  has been explained as a  consequence of
the experience of depersonalisation. The delu-
sion is a personal level response to an intract-
able and impenetrable loss of affective response
to the world. Of course to say that an experi-
ence is of depersonalization is not an explana-
tion  but  an  intuitive  characterization:  the
concept expresses the phenomenology of feeling
disconnected  from  the  world  including  one’s
own body, as though experiences are “not hap-
pening to me”. Such feelings plausibly originate
in what we might  call  affective derealisation:
the failure of emotionally salient events to trig-
ger  affective responses in the patient so that
the world feels strange and unreal. Since affect-
ive responses are a form of bodily experience it
makes sense that the Cotard delusion is often
expressed as beliefs  about alteration in  body
state: in particular that the body is vanishing,
disappearing or dead. And since there is an in-
timate connection between felt body state and
self-awareness this loss of normal affective re-
sponse is expressed as the idea that the self no
longer exists. 
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But surely it is equally intuitively plaus-
ible that a person suffering from derealisation
might express the experience by saying that the
world  (perhaps  including  her  body)  feels
strange,  emotionally inert  or unreal? In other
words, why does the patient not report dereal-
isation,  the  feeling  that  the  world  is  unreal?
One possible answer is contained in the follow-
ing suggestion:
Cases of the Cotard delusion have been re-
ported . . . in which the subject proceeds
beyond reporting her rotting flesh or her
death to the stage of describing the world
as  an  inert  cosmos  whose  processes  she
merely  registers  without  using  the  first-
person pronoun….The patient does not re-
cognize experiences  as  significant  for  her
because, due to the global suppression of
affect [ex hypothesi a consequence of ex-
treme depression],  she has no qualitative
responses  to  the  acquisition  of  even  the
most  significant  information.  These  ex-
treme  cases  of  the  Cotard  delusion  are
those in which neural systems on which af-
fect depends are suppressed and, as a con-
sequence, it seems to the patient as if her
experiences do not belong to her. Thus the
patient reports, not changes in herself, but
changes in the states of the universe, one
component  of  which  is  her  body,  now
thought of as another inert physical sub-
stance first decomposing and finally disap-
pearing. (Gerrans 2000)
My earlier self suggested that when the patient
experiences global affective suppression she ex-
periences her body as simply a body, a physical
substance rather than the body which sustains
the self or the body qua self: Hence the deper-
sonalisation. However this simply begs the ques-
tion.  What  is  it  about  affective  processing
which transforms representations of body states
to representations of states of a self? 
4 Feelings of self-relevance
Appraisal theory is familiar to theorists of emo-
tion as the theory that emotions are representa-
tions of the significance of events for the organ-
ism. Fear, for example, results from the repres-
entation of objects as dangerous for the organ-
ism. Early appraisal theorists assimilated these
appraisals to beliefs about the properties of the
objects of emotion (Kenny 1963; Solomon 1976,
1993). Consequently appraisal theory has been
criticized as overly intellectualistic and as ignor-
ing the felt aspect of emotion. Fear is a visceral
state whose essence is  a feeling,  not  a judge-
ment, runs the objection. Equally an emotional
feeling may arise or persist in the absence of, or
in opposition to, a judgment. 
Recent  versions  of  the  theory avoid  this
objection  by  recognising  that  most  emotional
appraisals are in fact conducted by neural cir-
cuits that automatically link perception to the
automatic regulation of visceral and bodily re-
sponses.  Consequently  appraisals  issue  almost
instantaneously  in  feelings  that  reflect  the
nature of that appraisal. When we recognize a
familiar person and see her smile, for example,
the significance of that information for us has
been represented and that representation used
to initiate our own bodily response within a few
hundred  milliseconds  (Adolphs et  al. 2002;
Sander et al. 2003; Sander et al. 2005; N’Diaye
et al. 2009; Adolphs 2010).
The  consequence  of  these  appraisals  is
autonomically-regulated body states and action
tendencies that produce changes in visceral and
bodily state. These changes are sensed as affect-
ive feelings via specialised circuitry that evolved
to monitor organismic state. At any given mo-
ment we experience a “core affect” which is the
product  of  multiple  appraisals  along  different
dimensions at different time scales. 
These affective processes essentially repres-
ent the significance of incoming information for
the  organism along  a  number  of  different  di-
mensions—hedonic, prudential, dangerous, nox-
ious, nourishing, interesting, and so on. These
representations, however, relate an aspect of or-
ganismic  functioning  to  a  represented  object;
they do not represent a self  per se. The detec-
tion of danger alerts the organism to the need
for avoidance, for example. The consequent feel-
ing of fear is a way of sensing the bodily con-
sequences of that appraisal. The self as an en-
Gerrans, P. (2015). All the Self We Need.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 15(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570078 5 | 19
www.open-mind.net
tity need not be represented in either the initial
appraisal  or  the  consequent  experience.  The
self-relevance (as appraisal theorists call it) of
dangerous objects is however  implicitly repres-
ented in the bodily experience of fear. The same
is  true of  all  affective experiences:  they carry
important information about the world and the
way the organism is faring in it in virtue of the
appraisal  processes  which  generate  them.  But
they do so without representing a self  in any
substantial sense. Rather they relate salient in-
formation  to  organismic  goals  represented  at
different levels of explicitness for different pur-
poses (Tomkins 1962, 1991; Scherer 2004). 
Cognitive  neuroscience  has  identified  cir-
cuits that function as “hubs” of distributed cir-
cuits that determine the subjective relevance of
information.  Lower-level  hubs,  of  which  the
amygdala  is  a  central  component,  implement
rapid online appraisals (Sander et al. 2003; Ad-
olphs 2010) and coordinate visceral and bodily
responses. These lower level hubs associate af-
fective  experiences  with  online  sensorimotor
processing of the type often described as reflex-
ive: that is initiated by, and dependent on, en-
counters with the environment. It follows that
such experiences decay with the representation
of the stimulus. They are stimulus dependent.
Such reflexive affective processes can of course
only sustain a feeling of self-relevance moment
to moment.
5 Simulation, affective sampling, and the 
self
By self-awareness, however, philosophers have in
mind the experience of being an entity that ex-
ists through time, which is not something that
can be  produced by reflexive  processing.  The
organism needs to be able  to represent  itself,
not  just  moment-to-moment  but  as  an  entity
with a history and a future (“to consider itself
the same thing at a time and over time”.)  It
must therefore be able to link affective experi-
ence to memory and prospection in  the same
way as it links it to perception and sensory pro-
cessing moment to moment. That is to say that
it must be able to appraise episodes of memory
and foresight for self-relevance.
Because  the  temporal  window of  human
cognition extends beyond the present we have
evolved systems that recapitulate important as-
pects of reflexive affective processing for those
higher level cognitive processes involved in plan-
ning,  recollection,  prospection,  and  decision-
making. These systems simulate temporally dis-
tant experiences by rehearsing some of the same
perceptual and emotional mechanisms activated
by the simulated situation. As a result we can
recall previous episodes of experience and ima-
gine future episodes of experience and link those
simulations  to  other  high-level  cognitive  pro-
cesses in order to plan and decide. We remem-
ber  being  sunburnt  and  imagine  getting  skin
cancer  when  deciding  whether  to  go  to  the
beach at noon (Gusnard et al. 2001; Buckner et
al. 2008; Fair et al. 2008; Broyd et al. 2009).
These simulations are the raw material of
autobiographical narratives whose structure and
duration can vary depending on cognitive con-
text. They may be as simple as recall of a single
event that triggers a flash of affect, but can also
be assembled into elaborate histories and ima-
ginative rehearsals depending on the cognitive
context. This narrative capacity provides a cru-
cial aspect of cognitive control possibly unique
to humans. The most important aspect of these
simulations is  sometimes overlooked in studies
that  emphasise  their  quasi-perceptual  content.
That is the fact that the simulation of percep-
tual and sensory experience evokes affective as-
sociations.  We  simulate  a  scene  in  order  to
evoke the affective responses that represent the
significance of events and objects for us. When
we imagine or recall an episode of experience its
affective significance is also represented in ex-
perience  via  the  offline  rehearsal  of  affective
processing. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex
is a structure which “traffics” or makes avail-
able  the  affective  information.  In  effect,  the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex recapitulates at a
higher level the properties of the amygdala. In
so doing it associates affective information with
explicitly  represented  information  used  in  re-
flective decision making and planning (Ochsner
et al. 2002;  Bechara & Damasio 2005). It thus
allows the subject to make explicit reflective ap-
praisals. When I lie on the beach I have pleas-
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ant feelings produced by low-level appraisal sys-
tems.  When I  imagine  or  recall  lying  on  the
beach while trying to decide whether to holiday
in  Thailand  or  Senegal  my ventromedial  pre-
frontal cortex makes available the affective in-
formation prompted by that simulation. 
This is why “pure” episodic memory stud-
ies (such as recall of content of visual scenes) do
not activate the ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
whereas “activations in  the ventromedial PFC
[prefrontal cortex] … are almost invariably found
in  autobiographical memory  studies”  (Gilboa
2004, p. 1336; my emphasis). Gilboa (2004) sug-
gests  that  this  is  because  “autobiographical
memory relies  on  a  quick  intuitive  ‘feeling  of
rightness’ to monitor the veracity and cohesive-
ness of retrieved memories in relation to an ac-
tivated  self-schema.”  This  is  consistent  with
studies  showing  activity  in  the  ventromedial
and related subcortical structures when people
make  intuitive  (that  is,  rapid  and  semiauto-
matic)  judgments  about  themselves.  When
people make judgments about themselves using
semantic  knowledge  and  symbolic  reasoning,
ventromedial structures are less active.
This idea is  supported by studies  of  pa-
tients  with  lesions  to  the  ventromedial  pre-
frontal cortex. These patients oscillate between
various  forms  of  reflexive  cognition  and more
abstract forms of thinking using semantic know-
ledge and procedural reasoning. What they have
lost  is  the  ability,  provided  by  ventromedial
structures,  to  simulate  affective  and  motiva-
tional response in the absence of the stimulus,
while they retain the ability to process informa-
tion in an abstract way. Consequently, a ventro-
medial patient may be able to do a utility cal-
culation about her personal future but be un-
able to act on that knowledge. It appears that
semantic  knowledge  is  motivationally  inert.
Such results are often used to emphasize the ne-
cessary role of affect in deliberation, but they
also suggest that what those affective responses
do is provide the necessary personal perspective
on  information.  They  make  the  information
mine, so to speak. Furthermore, this diminish-
ment is not just at a time, but over time. These
patients,  although  not  amnesic  in  the  strict
sense of the term, have very limited ability for
autobiographical  recall  or  prospection.  They
have  no  sense  of  a  persisting  self  (Damasio
1994;  Bechara &  Damasio 2005;  Gerrans &
Kennett 2010).
This  suggests  that  disorders  in  which
people feel a diminished sense of self would be
characterized  by  hypoactivity  in  the  ventro-
medial  prefrontal  cortex.  In  a  review  of  the
neuropsychological  and  imaging  literature,
Koenigs & Grafman concluded that “one could
conceive of the VMPFC patients’  selective re-
duction in depressive symptoms as a secondary
effect of  a primary lack of self-awareness and
self-reflection” (2009, p. 242; my emphasis). In
other words, patients with ventromedial damage
do not “feel” personally affected when consider-
ing even quite distressing events because they
cannot access or activate the required affective
responses.
It seems that “mine-ness” of experience is
a cognitive achievement mediated by the ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex. As we noted above the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex is suited to play
this  role  because  it  recapitulates  at  a  higher
level many of the processing properties of lower-
level hubs of emotional processing that repres-
ent self-relevance. Rather than reinvent the cog-
nitive wheel for controlled processing, evolution
has provided pathways that traffic affective and
reward-predictive  information  processed  auto-
matically at lower levels to controlled processing
coordinated by the ventromedial prefrontal cor-
tex. 
In  effect,  these  studies  suggest  that  in
both online reflexive and offline reflective pro-
cessing affective processes are needed to repres-
ent the significance of the information for the
subject, and it is the consequent bodily feelings
that  produce  the  feeling of  self-awareness  My
version of this view is in some ways an amalgam
of ideas found in Seth (2013) and Proust (2013).
All three of us share the view that the mind is
hierarchically organized, and that feelings of self
awareness emerge when higher order, metacog-
nitive processes such as planning or deliberation
integrate bodily information which signals relev-
ance. On Seth’s and my view the Anterior Insu-
lar Cortex (AIC) is in some ways specialized for
that function in view of its architecture: it does
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not merely relay first order bodily information
but is involved in the representation of the sig-
nificance  of  that  information.  Thus  it  is  well
placed to be the source of some of the metacog-
nitive  feelings  identified  by  Proust (2013)  as
serving crucial indicator functions.3
Affective processes represent the relevance
of information for an organism and initiate suit-
able action tendencies and autonomic responses.
The bodily consequences are sensed and sum-
marised by specialised systems that inform the
organism how it is faring in the world: this is af-
fective information (Prinz 2004). This affective
information is made available to other cognitive
processes, which operate at different time scales,
from instantaneous and automatic, to reflective
and controlled. We are able to think and behave
as continuing entities because the salience of in-
formation for different organismic goals is rep-
resented by affective processes at different time
scales  and levels  of  explicitness.  An organism
that can  use that affective information in the
process is a self. 
This suggests that if the ability to access
affective information is lost then self-awareness
would also be diminished. Thus as we suggested
above a key to the experience of depersonalisa-
tion in the Cotard delusion is the profound loss
of  affect  associated  with  extreme  depression.
This suggestion is almost correct but it ignores
another stage in the production of depersonal-
isation. After all, from what we have said so far
affective processes represent the self-relevance of
information. If the consequent feelings are un-
available  the world  should feel  not  significant
for the subject. That is to say the subject might
feel detached from the world or as if the world
was  emotionally  inert.  But  it  seems  an extra
step from a lack of affective experience to the
feeling or thought of  non-existence.  Of  course
the step might be a small  one.  This  was the
3 There is an interesting debate to be had here. On the views of e.g.,
Damasio and Bechara affective feelings are not metacognitive but ex-
periences produced by lower level or first order processes associated
with metacognitive processes (such as planning and decision mak-
ing). Proust refers to feelings generated by metacognitive processes.
On the view proposed here the AIC metarepresents the significance
of  first  order  bodily  information  (e.g.,  visceral  or  tonic  muscular
state) in the context of self-relevant metacognition. It allows the sub-
ject to experience not just body state but the relevance of that body
state. 
idea of Gerrans in his pioneering work at the
dawn  of  the  millennium.  He  suggested  that
there was such an intimate connection between
affective experience and the self that any pro-
found involuntary change in affect would be felt
as a change to the self. However since then in-
teresting work on depersonalisation disorder has
provided  a  deeper  understanding  of  the  phe-
nomenon.  That  work draws on  the  predictive
coding theory of cognitive function.
6 The predictive coding hierarchy
The mind is organized as a hierarchical system
that uses representations of the world and its
own states to control behavior. According to re-
cently influential Bayesian theories of the mind,
all levels of the cognitive hierarchy exploit the
same principle:  error  correction  (Friston 2003;
Hohwy et al. 2008;  Jones &  Love 2011;  Clark
2012,  2013;  Hohwy 2013). Each cognitive sys-
tem uses models of its domain to predict its fu-
ture  informational  states,  given  actions  per-
formed  by  the  organism.  When  those  predic-
tions are satisfied, the model is reinforced; when
they are not, the model is revised or updated,
and new predictions are generated to govern the
process of error correction. Discrepancy between
actual and predicted information state is called
surprisal and represented in the form of an er-
ror signal. That signal is referred to a higher-
level supervisory system, which has access to a
larger database of potential solutions, to gener-
ate an instruction whose execution will cancel
the error and minimize surprisal (Friston 2003;
Hohwy et al. 2008). The process iterates until
error signals are cancelled by suitable action.
This is a very basic outline of the predict-
ive coding idea dodges a crucial question: the
extent to which Bayesian formalisations actually
describe  neurocomputational  processes  rather
than serving as a predictive calculus for neuros-
cience (Jones & Love 2011; Hohwy 2013; Clark
2012;  Park &  Friston 2013;  Moutoussis et  al.
2014).  It  also  blurs  an  important  distinction
which is  not  salient  to formalisations  such as
Bayesian theory: namely the fact that not all
higher  level  control  systems  can  and  do
smoothly cancel prediction errors generated at
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lower levels. For example vision and motor con-
trol are good examples of predictive coding sys-
tems (Hohwy 2013). Often however experiences
best  explained  as  carrying  information  about
prediction error are not cancelled by the adop-
tion of  a higher-level belief.  Consider déjà vu
experiences which signal mismatch between an
affect of familiarity and perception of a novel
scene (O’Connor & Moulin 2010). We know the
scene  is  novel,  but  it  still  feels  familiar.  The
point is just that the higher order belief does
not  always  smoothly  cancel  prediction  error.
And this  should be expected.  Coding formats
are not uniform across cognitive systems, which
is why sensory and higher-level cognitive integ-
ration is such a cognitive achievement for the
mind.
From our point of view what matters are
the key ideas of  hierarchical organization,  up-
ward referral of surprisal and top-down cancel-
lation of error. Also crucial is the idea that the
highest levels of cognitive control involve active,
relatively unconstrained, exploration of solution
space. This is the level at which attention can
be redirected to alternative solutions and their
imaginative rehearsal. Phenomena such as delu-
sion represent a high level response to an ob-
stinate signal of prediction error that cannot be
simply cancelled from the top down. This way
of thinking of the mind weds a version of pre-
dictive  coding  theory  to  insights  from neuro-
computational theory that treat executive sys-
tems as specialized for the resolution of prob-
lems  which  cannot  be  solved  at  lower  levels.
Thus at low levels in the hierarchy the structure
of priors and errors and referral of surprisal is
constrained,  modularized  some  might  say.  At
the so-called personal level of belief fixation pre-
dictive coding best describes the idea that those
experiences which command executive resources
are  those  which  signal  prediction  error  which
cannot  be  resolved  at  lower  perceptual  and
quasi perceptual levels. This is at least one level
at  which  predictive  coding  involves  active
sampling  of  information  (active  inference)  as
well  as  the routine  cancelling of  surprisal  ac-
cording to a well defined prior model. The latter
almost defines perception. The former, accord-
ing to  O’Reilly &  Munakata 2000) as well  as
predictive  coding  theorists  (Spratling 2008)  is
definitive of executive control.
Thus most of the detection and correction
of error occurs at low levels in the processing
hierarchy at temporal thresholds and using cod-
ing  formats  that  are  opaque to  introspection.
Keeping  one’s  balance,  parsing  sentences  and
recognizing faces are examples. We have no in-
trospective access to the cognitive operations in-
volved and are aware only of the outputs. This
is the sense in which our mental life is  tacit:
automatic,  hard to verbalize,  and experienced
as fleeting sensations that vanish quickly in the
flux  of  experience.  This  is  the  “Unbearable
Automaticity  of  Being”  (Bargh &  Chartrand
1999). However even these relatively automatic
processes generate experiences of which we can
become aware. The recognition of faces, for ex-
ample, produces an affective response within a
few hundred milliseconds. When that affective
response  is  absent  or  suppressed  due to  mal-
function  a  prediction  is  violated  and the  dis-
crepancy between familiar face and lack of fa-
miliar affect is referred to higher levels of exec-
utive control to deal with the problem.
At the higher levels  of  cognitive control,
surprisal is signalled as experience that becomes
the target of executive processes. These meta-
cognitive processes evolved to enable humans to
reflect and deliberate to control their behaviour.
The highest levels of  cognitive control involve
reflection, deliberation, rehearsal and evaluation
of  alternative  courses  of  action  and  explicit
reasoning. When for example a predicted affect
is absent we might find ourselves in the position
of a patient described by Brighetti who lost af-
fective  responses  to  her  family  and  her  pro-
fessor. She had “identity recognition of familiar
faces,  associated with a lack of  SCR [SCR is
skin conductance response, a measure of electro-
dermal  activity  consequent  on  affective  pro-
cessing]” (Brighetti et al. 2007). In other words
her predicted affective response to familiars was
absent, which resulted in an experience becom-
ing the target of higher-level control processes.
Such patients sometimes produce the Capgras
delusion that the familiar person has been re-
placed by an imposter or double. A truly florid
delusion  such as  is  sometimes  seen  in  schizo-
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phrenia might elaborate the delusional thought
into an epic paranoid narrative. 
The aim here is not to enter into the con-
troversy about the explanation of the Capgras
delusion but to note the role of the architecture
that generates it (Young et al. 1994;  Breen et
al. 2001;  Ellis &  Lewis 2001). Higher levels of
cognitive control are engaged to deal with error
signals  referred  from lower  levels  in  the  hier-
archy. Perhaps the most important level in the
hierarchy for personal and social life is the level
at  which  subjectively  adequate  narratives  are
generated to make experience intelligible and by
which we communicate our experiences to oth-
ers.  This  is  the  level  at  which  delusional
thoughts  originate.  By  subjectively  adequate
here I merely mean “fits the experience of the
subject”. At even higher levels of cognitive con-
trol we can revise and reject those subjectively
adequate autobiographical narratives, replacing
them with empirical theories that draw on pub-
licly available norms of reasoning and semantic
knowledge to produce objectively adequate re-
sponses to subjective experience (Gerrans 2014).
Delusions are best conceptualized as higher-level
responses  to  prediction  error  which,  however,
cannot  cancel  those  errors.  In  fact  as  Clark
(2013) points out such delusory models in effect
“predict”  further  experiences  of  that  type,
which  means  that  the  delusion  will  be
strengthened.
A very  important  point  to  note  for  the
subsequent explanation of depersonalization and
the Cotard delusion is that it is not the absence
of affect per se which produces the error signal
and engages higher-level cognition. Lack of af-
fective response alone does not require a high
level response unless that lack of affect is unpre-
dicted. That is why we are not bothered by lack
of response to strangers (we don’t predict it at
any level in the control hierarchy) but if a new
mother has no affective response to her baby
the  experience  can be  part  of  a  syndrome of
post-natal depression.
The example of post-natal depression al-
lows us to make another important point about
the  relationship  between  predicted  affect  and
psychosis.  Mothers  most  vulnerable  to  post-
natal  depression  are  those  who  had  powerful
positive  expectations  of  motherhood  and  the
bond with the infant. When that bond does not
materialize for some reason they are confronted
with a distressing lack of predicted affective re-
sponse. Sometimes this will produce a kind of
Capgras  delusion  regarding  the  baby.  The
mother might say that the baby has been re-
placed  or  is  an  alien  (Brockington &  Kumar
1982). Interestingly, and tellingly, if the mother
is also extremely anxious the condition can be
even more serious. Anxious attention to the ex-
perience tends to magnify the problem.
This  role for anxiety is  nicely elucidated
by  the  predictive  coding  framework.  Formal
considerations aside,  the concept of  predictive
coding places a huge emphasis on the signaling
of error. This means that incoming information
must be compared to a prediction and the dif-
ference computed and referred to a control sys-
tem.  At higher  levels  those error  signals  take
the form of experiences. These experiences are
often imprecise and opaque since they are pro-
duced by lower  level  systems  that  encode in-
formation in different formats to those used by
explicit  metarepresentational  capacities.  They
also compete for metarepresentational resources
among the constant flux of experiences that en-
gage attention. Thus they create a problem of
working out for any experience how much is sig-
nal and how much is noise. 
It is  very important for high-level cogni-
tion to be targeted as precisely as possible for
only as long as required. Thus any vagueness in
experience needs to be resolved. Attention is the
process  which  solves  this  problem.  Hohwy
(2012, p. 1; my emphasis) makes the point for
perceptual inference but it applies in general:
conscious perception  can  be  seen  as  the
upshot  of  prediction  error  minimization
and attention as the optimization of preci-
sion  expectations  during  such  perceptual
inference.
Clark (2013, p. 190) makes a similar point:
Attention, if this is correct, is simply one
means  by  which  certain  error-unit  re-
sponses are given increased weight, hence
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becoming more apt to drive learning and
plasticity, and to engage compensatory ac-
tion.
The point is that attention is directed to error
signals in order to make them more precise by
increasing  the signal  to  noise  ratio.  Attention
amplifies  the  signal  and  maintains  it  while
higher-level systems try and interpret the exper-
ience and manage appropriate responses. If the
response works the error signal is cancelled and
attention can be directed elsewhere.
Within  this  framework  we  can  make  an
observation  about  anxiety  that  can  be  over-
looked by approaches that concentrate on the
arousal, hypervigiliance or the associated beliefs
concerning threat or danger. These approaches
de-emphasise a crucial element. That is uncer-
tainty. Anxiety is an adaptive mechanism that
primes the organism cognitively and physiolo-
gically to resolve uncertainty. Thus, if a predic-
tion cannot be verified, or an error signal dis-
ambiguated, anxiety in this sense will result. Of
course what we call pathological anxiety is the
dysfunctional  activation  and  maintenance  of
these mechanisms.  The point  is  that  someone
who is anxious in this way will continue to mis-
allocate attentional, cognitive and physiological
resources  to experiences.  Another  point about
anxiety  is  that,  in  pathological  cases,  action
does not cancel the signal or the dysfunctional
allocation of resources to it. This may be why
the role of anxiety in depersonalisation is not
straightforward.  Some recent  studies  have  not
found a strong correlation between anxiety and
depersonalisation (e.g., Medford 2012). However
the scales used to measure anxiety give a score
that sums scores for self-report of feelings, beha-
viour and cognition. The suggestion here is that
what really matters is the allocation of atten-
tion to signals which cannot be resolved, per-
haps  because  they are intrinsically  noisy,  am-
biguous  or  have  insufficient  information.  It  is
also important that the patient cannot resolve
the uncertainty by revising the predictive model
that  generates  it  since  that  is  usually  main-
tained low in the predictive hierarchy by mech-
anisms that are not accessible. The person with
Capgras  delusion,  for  example,  automatically
predicts affective response to familiar faces and
when it goes missing there is nothing she can do
to revise that prediction. Instead she is confron-
ted with an anomalous experience, which auto-
matically captures attention. Similarly with de-
pression. Loss of affective response is not some-
thing that can be restored from the top down.
In some cases of post-natal depression all
these factors seem to be operative. The mother
expected to bond with the infant  but in fact
perhaps birth was traumatic, the baby did not
attach  straightaway,  and  the  mother  needed
more  support  and  reassurance  than  she  re-
ceived.  She  was  left  distressed  and unable  to
cope which made bonding and attachment even
more difficult. This would be bad enough but if
the mother had a strong prior expectation that
motherhood would be straightforwardly reward-
ing a prediction is violated. If the mother is also
anxious she will attend intensively to the result-
ant experience of absent affect, but she will en-
counter only further feelings of emptiness and
panic. The presence of the baby and the expect-
ations of family and friend only compound the
sense that she is not feeling what she should be
feeling. What happens next depends on context
and support but it is not really surprising, espe-
cially  given  the  relationship  between  massive
hormonal fluctuation and emotional regulation,
that  in  some  cases  new  mothers  develop
psychotic symptoms (Spinelli 2009).
7 Depersonalisation
Depersonalisation Disorder (DPD) is character-
ized by “alteration in the perception or experi-
ence of the self so that one feels detached from
and as if one is an outside observer of one’s own
mental processes” (American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation 2000). Critchley points out that DPD is
often accompanied by alexithymia, a condition
in  which  conscious  awareness  of  emotional
states is compromised or absent. This is consist-
ent with findings summarized by Medford that
“de-affectualisation”, a reduction or absence of
affective response, presents as a core feature of
clinical  cases.  Depersonalisation  is  a  separate
disorder  to  derealisation  (the  feeling  that  the
world is inanimate or unreal) but derealisation
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is often an important aspect of depersonalisa-
tion.  Indeed,  as  Medford  describes  their  rela-
tionship, depersonalisation can sometime be a
response  to  derealisation  (Sierra et  al. 2002;
Hunter et al. 2004).
Seth et al. (2011, p. 9; my emphasis) sum-
marize a range of findings about DPD as fol-
lows: “In short, DPD can be summarized as a
psychiatric condition marked by the selective di-
minution of the subjective reality of the self and
world”. They explain this diminution as the res-
ult of the loss of “sense of presence”, the feeling
of  being  engaged in  experience.  This  is  what
they mean by subjective reality: the condition is
not like an hallucination or delusion in which
objective reality is misrepresented by faulty per-
ception  or  belief  fixation.  In  fact  the  patient
correct represents “objective reality” but loses
the sense of herself as the subject of experience.
In the attempt to explain the loss of the
sense of presence cognitive neuroscience has de-
veloped a theoretical picture that considerably
augments older theories. On those older theories
DPD represented a suppression or inhibition of
emotion as a response to trauma or distress. On
this  view  DPD  activates  mechanisms  which
might in other circumstances be adaptive. For
example, if the subject of violent attack deactiv-
ated those mechanisms which produce the ex-
perience of distress that would qualify as an ad-
aptive response to trauma. Of course such a re-
sponse is only adaptive in the short term. Inab-
ility to feel distress might also reduce avoidance
behavior with disastrous consequences. 
It  seems that  the deactivation is  accom-
plished by inhibitory activity in the Ventrolat-
eral Prefrontal Cortex (VLPFC). The VLPFC is
a structure which plays a crucial role in the reg-
ulation of affective feeling, especially as part of
a  process  of  reappraisal  (Füstös et  al. 2013).
The adaptive aspect here is that it allows the
subject to redirect attention and divert cognit-
ive  resources  to  alternative  interpretations  of
self-relevance and response behaviour by inhib-
iting an experience that would otherwise mono-
polise  cognition.  This  role  has been tested in
tasks which involve the top down regulation of
negative affect but, as  Medford says, “In DPD
such suppression is apparently involuntary (and
largely resistant to volitional control), but it is
reasonable to suppose that this will nevertheless
engage  similar  inhibitory  networks”  (2012,  p.
142).  Thus the patient with DPD experiences
the result of involuntary deactivation of systems
that produce the bodily experience of emotion. 
These ideas are consistent with the evid-
ence  from  cognitive  neuroscience  about  other
primary neural correlates of DPD. Hyperactivity
in VLPFC leads to hypoactivity in the Anterior
Insular Cortex (AIC). That reduced activity in
the AIC produces the loss of a sense of pres-
ence. This hypothesis results from findings that
it has a primary role in higher order representa-
tion of interoceptive (visceral, autonomic, bod-
ily) states. It generates the bodily feelings that
signal how we are faring in the world moment
to moment consequent on affective processing.
Activity  in  the  AIC  produces  what  Damasio
called the “core self” and what Critchley calls
“the sense of presence”. As Critchley says, 
evidence  from  a  variety  of  sources  con-
verges to suggest a representation of auto-
nomic  and  visceral  responses  within  an-
terior insula cortex, where, particularly on
the right side, this information is access-
ible  to  conscious  awareness,  influencing
emotional feelings (2005, p. 162). 
When Damasio made his contributions to the
neurophilosophy of emotions and self-represent-
ation the computational theory in the field was
less developed so that we can now make some
additional  observations  about  the  role  of  the
AIC.
To do so we first reiterate the distinction
between being able to sense body state, which is
the  phenomenon baptized  by  Damasio  intero-
ception,  (to  distinguish  it  from  exteroception
[perception of the external world]), and sensing
states of a self. The distinction is a subtle one
of course but we can approach it intuitively by
noting that there is a crucial difference between
being able to sense heart rate, blood pressure or
temperature as part of an illness and as part of
an emotional episode. We observed earlier that
the second kind of awareness is the one we de-
scribe as self-awareness in virtue of the fact that
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it reflects affective processing rather than pure
bodily regulation. There is a difference in feel-
ing state caused by raises in blood pressure gen-
erated by walking up stairs and by heated argu-
ment. This is so even though heart rate is heart
rate, however caused. But the point of affective
processing, as we saw, is to assess the self-relev-
ance of unpredicted changes in things like heart
rate and to indicate to the subject how and why
they might matter in the cognitive context.
The experiential differences between heart
rate per se and heart rate consequent on affect-
ive processing can be explained in terms of the
principle of hierarchical computational organiza-
tion,  reflected  in  cortical  organization  (Craig
2009, 2010; Dunn et al. 2010). The insular cor-
tex  is  hierarchically  organized  to  map  body
state at different levels of abstraction and integ-
ration. Posterior sections map body state dir-
ectly and integrate those representations to co-
ordinate reflexive regulatory functions. Thus the
Posterior  Insular  Cortex  (PIC),  for  example,
represents things like blood pressure and depar-
tures from homeostasis and integrates that in-
formation  to  enable  reflexive  regulatory  pro-
cessing. More anterior regions re-represent and
integrate this  information in  formats available
for higher levels of cognitive control. If we sense
raised blood pressure the PIC is primary in the
representation of that information. When, how-
ever, we are deciding how to respond, we need
to integrate that information with current and
long term goals,  representations  of  contextual
information,  memory,  planning  and  inference.
We may have to inhibit or reprogram automatic
behavioral tendencies (not punch the boss) and
perhaps reappraise the situation. Thus we need
a way, not just to feel raised blood pressure, but
to  feel  its  significance in  order  to  program a
suitable response. This is the role of the AIC. 
This explains a recent finding which seems
paradoxical on the “somatic” James-Lange view
of emotions revived by Damasio. On that view
emotions are representations of body state sim-
pliciter. The feeling of fear is the feeling of be-
ing  primed  to  take  avoidance  action,  for  ex-
ample. Michal and collaborators compared the
“interoceptive accuracy”, that is ability of pa-
tients to judge body state (using heart rate as a
proxy),  of  patients  with  DPD to  normal  pa-
tients. Strikingly they found that “[there] was
no  correlation  of  the  severity  of  ‘anomalous
body  experiences’  and  depersonalization  with
measures  of  interoceptive  accuracy.”  They  ex-
plained this finding as follows: “[The] findings
highlight  a  striking  discrepancy of  normal  in-
teroception  with  overwhelming  experiences  of
disembodiment in DPD.  This may reflect diffi-
culties of DPD patients to integrate their vis-
ceral and bodily perceptions into a sense of their
selves” (Michal & Reuchlein 2014, p. 1; my em-
phasis).
The  AIC  can  only  integrate  currently
available bodily feeling. As  Craig says, it “rep-
resents the sentient self at one moment of time
[and]  provides  the  basis  for  the  continuity  of
subjective  emotional  awareness  in  a  finite
present” (2009, p. 67). However we can extend
the temporal range of information represented
by those feelings by integrating them with rep-
resentation of past and future episodes of exper-
ience  and/or  semantic  knowledge.  Simulations
involved in planning and episodic memory are
associated with activation of the AIC to provide
sense of extended self. In other words it is the
integration of the metarepresentations of body
state produced by the AIC with representations
of  episodes of  a temporally extended autobio-
graphy that produces the feeling that we are a
self with a past and future, rather than a series
of disconnected selves, moment to moment.
Nothing in what I have said refutes skepti-
cism about the self, or episodic theories of first
person experience (Strawson 2004). It is in fact
consistent  with  the  idea  that  experience  is  a
series of episodes. Whether we feel those epis-
odes are ours depends on how they are integ-
rated. There is no suggestion that everyone in-
tegrates them the same way or that integration
evokes  an equally  strong sense  of  presence  in
each person. All I have suggested is that there
are mechanisms which can create self-awareness
moment to moment and mechanisms which in-
tegrate  those  moments  of  self-awareness  with
higher level forms of cognitive control that rep-
resent past and future actions and outcomes in
order for the organism to assess the self-relev-
ance  of  actual  and potential  actions.  The ex-
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planation of awareness of self-relevance in differ-
ent  contexts is  a sufficient  explanation of  the
phenomenon of self-awareness that was our ini-
tial quarry. 
Craig adds a subtle but important quali-
fication to this  account.  He (and others)  re-
mind us that if the predictive coding account
of the mind is correct then we are never dir-
ectly  aware  of  objects,  including  the  body
(Craig 2009,  2010;  Seth et al. 2011;  Garfinkel
&  Critchley 2013).  Rather  representations  of
objects are computed on the basis of discrep-
ancy between their predicted informational ef-
fects on us and actual incoming information.
It is  fluctuations and discrepancies measured
against  expectations  computed  at  different
levels in the control hierarchy that determine
the  information  that  becomes  consciously
available. “An expected event does not need to
be explicitly represented or communicated to
higher cortical areas which have processed all
of its relevant features prior to its occurrence”
(Bubic et al. 2010, p. 10;  Clark 2013, p. 199;
my emphasis.)
The same should be true of neural activa-
tion in the AIC, and hence of moments of self-
awareness. We are aware of what is relevant to
us  via  unpredicted  changes  in  bodily  feeling
consequent on affective processing.
This latter feature is  the key to under-
standing  the  link  between  “de-affectualisa-
tion”, as Medford called it, and depersonaliza-
tion (Medford 2012). It is not the fact that af-
fect is suppressed that matters, but that affect
which was predicted to occur does not in vir-
tue of  the  involuntary inhibition of  the AIC
by the VLPFC. When people engage in volun-
tary  or  effortful  inhibition  of  affect  they  do
not feel  depersonalized. We noted earlier the
role  of  expectation  in  post-natal  depression,
but  there  the  expectation  is  of  affective  re-
sponse to a specific object, a baby. In deper-
sonalization it seems that almost all expected
affective feelings are absent because of hyper-
activity in the VLPFC. 
The predictive coding framework also al-
lows us to finesse explanations of the role of
anxiety in the experience of derealisation. We
noted that Cotard described anxiety as part of
the aetiology of the depersonalization experi-
ence in Cotard delusion. Medford, in an early
discussion of DPD, also postulated a role for
anxiety in order to explain an apparent para-
dox of DPD: the distress experienced by the
patient at the absence of affective response. It
is  not  merely  that  the  patient  has  no  emo-
tions, but, as a patient of Medford’s said, “I
don’t have any emotions—it makes me so un-
happy.”  Medford (2012) pointed out that this
is only slightly paradoxical: the distress is at
the lack of internal affect, the inability to feel
rather  than  at  the  derealisation  of  the  ex-
ternal world. Medford related this specifically
to  the  anxiety  component  of  the  syndrome.
The patient expects that the world will induce
positive affect but when it does not an expect-
ation is violated and the patient anxiously at-
tends to that absence of affect. On this view
highly anxious patients are hyperattentive to
their  experience and encounter,  not the nor-
mal  bodily  experience,  which  represents  how
they are faring in the world, but a strange ab-
sence of such experience, in combination with
intact exteroception which tells them that the
world  is  unchanged  (Paulus &  Stein 2010;
Garfinkel &  Critchley 2013;  Seth 2013;  Ter-
asawa et al. 2013). Their problem is that they
no longer feel the relevance of changes in their
own bodies and the world to themselves and
this inability to feel the world increases their
anxiety.  Medford  quotes  an  earlier  theorist
(Ackner 1954) who noted “increased respons-
iveness for anxiety of internal origin, whereas
that of external origin [is] reduced” (Medford
2012, p. 141).
This perhaps explains the differences in
casual  aetiology  between  depersonalisation
arising in the Cotard syndrome and in DPD.
In  the  Cotard  syndrome  something  is  amiss
with the mechanisms that appraise perceptual
and  interoceptive  information  for  self-relev-
ance. The AIC is not getting any information
from affective systems to integrate and relay
to  higher  order  cognition.  Thus  felt  signific-
ance disappears. When the depressive patient
then focuses on her experience she feels alien-
ated  from  the  world  and  depersonalised.  In
the case of  DPD it appears that the AIC is
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hypoactive for  another  reason:  its  activity is
inhibited by the VLPFC. 
In both cases the patient attends to her
experience and tries to interpret it in order to
respond. This is consistent with the role pos-
tulated  by  predictive  coding  theories  for  at-
tention: the attempt to interpret and sharpen
the informational  content  of  a  signal  by im-
proving  the  signal  to  noise  ratio.  Unfortu-
nately  an  increase  in  attention  does  not
provide  any  increase  in  precision,  it  only
makes the absence of predicted response more
salient. Since those predictions are, in effect,
representations of expected self-relevance that
normally provide the experience of self-aware-
ness, the patient concludes that the self does
not exist. After all, the information necessary
to generate self-awareness is still in place. The
body, the world and first order representations
of their interaction are all represented in ex-
perience. What is lost is a sense of the signi-
ficance of those interactions for the body that
mediates them.
The explanation has become complicated
so at this point it is useful to situate it in terms
of  the  conceptual  architecture  (points  (i)-(iii)
below)  outlined  in  the  introduction.  On  this
view DPD arises in the following way as a per-
sonal level response to the absence of predicted
affective experience. 
i. Appraisal systems normally represent the
significance of information for the organ-
ism.  The  primary  way  of  experiencing
the result of those appraisals is via activ-
ation  in  the  AIC.  This  is  because  the
AIC is specialised for informing the sub-
ject, via bodily experience, of the affect-
ive significance of its encounters with the
world.  These  experiences  are  not  the
same as experience of body state per se
but  the  emotional  significance  of  that
body state.
ii. Those experiences can be rehearsed off-
line in planning and deliberation to ex-
tend  the  temporal  horizon  of  affective
experience. We feel like temporally integ-
rated  selves  because  memory  and  pro-
spection have affective significance.
iii. Predictive coding architecture has the ef-
fect of making discrepancy between anti-
cipated  and  actual  affective  feeling
highly salient.
iv. In DPD activity in the AIC is inhibited
most likely as a result of the involuntary
activity of the VLPFC.
v. Consequently  the  patient  has  normal
perceptual and sensory responses to the
world but those responses are not integ-
rated into a bodily representation which
informs  her  of  their  significance.  The
world feels derealised or as Medford puts
it de-affectualised
vi. However, given the way predictive coding
works, the patient actually has a model
of the world that predicts activity in the
AIC as a result of her perceptual encoun-
ters. Thus absence of AIC-produced ex-
perience is a prediction error that drives
metacognitive responses. 
vii. Those responses include increased attention
(driven by sub personal mechanisms of re-
source allocation) to the experience itself as
the patient tries to extract further informa-
tion from it. However, being produced by
subpersonal mechanisms the experience is
both intractable and inscrutable.
viii. Highly anxious people cannot divert at-
tention from the experience, since anxi-
ety is driven by the need to resolve un-
certainty. But the experience is inexplic-
able and irresolvable.
ix. The  patient’s  personal  level  interpreta-
tion of the experience is of depersonalisa-
tion “it feels like it is not happening to
me”.  The interpretation is  not  a direct
report of the experience, which I have ar-
gued is more like a total deaffectualisa-
tion. It amplifies it.
x. However  the  form  that  amplification
takes, depersonalisation, is explained by
the role such experiences have in creating
the normal sense of being a self. We feel
we are selves precisely because the signi-
ficance of the world for our organismic
goals is normally computed by appraisal
systems and represented in characteristic
forms of bodily experience.
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8 Anatomy of an avatar
Thomas Metzinger has argued that the persist-
ing self is neither an illusion (in the sense of a
perceptual  experience  whose  content  is  incor-
rect) nor a genuine entity in the sense of an ob-
ject existing outside the mind like a body or a
neural state. Instead the self is a creature of ex-
perience  itself,  a  phenomenal  representation
constructed by the brain to control the body.
This representation is in effect an avatar that
unifies  experiences  of  ownership  (the  sense  of
the integrity of bodily boundaries), perspective
on experience (which I have not talked about in
this essay), and selfhood (“a single coherent and
temporally stable phenomenal subject”.) An es-
pecially attractive aspect of Metzinger’s view is
that he treats the nature of the avatar as an
empirical matter so that our understanding of
its properties can be refined in the face of fur-
ther discoveries.
Metzinger’s  view nicely captures  what is
right and wrong in the illusory view of the self.
The illusory view is correct that the self is not
an object to be experienced in the same way as
we  experience  perceptual  or  somatic  objects.
The self is a way of experiencing the interaction
of the body and the world. It is a creature of
experience, constructed by the brain to navigate
the organism through the world. The self exists
as a virtual phenomenal entity in virtue of the
integrative processes that create and sustain it. 
The Fat  Controller  view of  the  self  also
has some of the picture correct. Self-awareness
is needed for higher order cognitive control to
integrate  and  organise  experience  moment  to
moment and to assimilate those experiences to
an ongoing autobiography for longer-term cog-
nitive control. However there is no single cognit-
ive process with an identifiable neural substrate
that represents an organiser/narrator. Also, and
this  is  where  Metzinger  is  correct,  there  is  a
genuine experience of being a person in control,
but this experience is the experience of integra-
tion itself,  which suggests that it is a process
which can disintegrate and degrade in different
ways and to different degrees. It also suggests,
although I have not discussed it here, that ex-
perience of the self is a prefrontal achievement
since  prefrontal  structures  are  specialised  for
“large world” integrative processing (the orches-
tration  of  synchronised  activity  across  widely
distributed brain areas).
The Embodied Self view is of course very
close to the one I have discussed here. I have ar-
gued that a particular type of bodily feeling is
what goes awry in depersonalisation and hence
that  those  feelings  produce  the  experience  of
the self. While this is correct, we need to recall
that Damasio distinguished between the “core
self”, which is very close to the phenomenon I
have  described,  and the  autobiographical  self.
Sometimes he treats the autobiographical self as
a more abstract or narrative construct. I have
tried to show that the integration of the core
self with the autobiographical self comes, as it
were, for free, given the automatic links between
affective  processing  and  the  processes  which
construct  the  autobiographical  self.  It  is  im-
possible to rehearse episodes of one’s autobio-
graphy without a sense  of  presence–unless,  of
course,  one has DPD or the Cotard delusion.
But  those  cases  demonstrate  the  component
structure of the avatar. 
Finally,  the  narrative  view  captures  the
crucial role of temporal integration in the ex-
perience of the self. But the self is not just a fic-
tional protagonist in the brain’s stories (though
it is that). The specialised simulation mechan-
isms  that  generate  the  actual  and  potential
autobiographies  automatically  integrate  each
episode with affective feeling. That feeling al-
lows us to experience in the process of recollec-
tion, imagination or narration the significance
of each episode to our unique organismic tra-
jectory. That, and the ability to incorporate and
act on those feelings, is all the selfhood anyone
needs. 
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